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NEO-KANTIANISM IN GERMANY AND FRANCE

Sebastian Luft and Fabien Capeilleres

I. NEO-KANTIANISM IN GERMANY

"Neo-Kantianism" is the name for a broad philosophical movement that sought to
revive Kant's philosophy in a radically changed philosophical and, more broadly,
cultural landscape. J It flourished especially in Germany, but also in France and,
to a lesser extent, in Italy and a few other European countries (including Eastern
Europe). It reached its apex between 1880 and 1920. In Germany, it grew out
of a decidedly academic context - as opposed to "renegade" writers such as
Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, who disdained academic philosophy
- although its origins lie, in part, in sociopolitical discourses stemming from of
the societal problems posed by the Industrial Revolution and the worker question (Arbeiterfrage) . The other background is the challenge posed to philosophy by the impressively and quickly progressing natural sciences in the era of
positivism. Both of these tendencies arose around the middle of the nineteenth
century, in a time when, as was often noted, Hegel's system had "collapsed:' In
both cases, to be elucidated below, the call was issued, "Back to Kant!,,2
1. Sebastian Luft is primarily responsible for the sections dealing with neo-Kantianism in
Germany, while Fabien Capeilleres is the primary author of the sections dealing with neoKantianism in France.
2. For a historical account of the origins of neo-Kantianism, see Klaus Christian Kohnke,
Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus: Die Deutsche Universitiitsphilosophie zwischen
Idealismus und Positivism us (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), abridged English translation, Th e
Rise ofNeo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism, R. J.
Hollingdale (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Thomas Willey,
Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, J 860-1914
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The term "neo-Kantianism" was not used until the late 1880s, and then in a
polemical fashion by its critics. The neo- Kantian movement, however, was (with
the possible exception of the Marburg School), far from unitary and cohesive,
as evidenced by the alternative names for this movement: (neo- )Criticism and
neo- Fichteanism, among others. But around 1900, "neo-Kantianism" stuck. The
demarcations concerning who belongs to this movement and who does not are to
this day contested. Although it was a very broad movement, thinkers who might
well be counted among its members - Nicolai Hartmann, Wilhelm Dilthey, or
Edmund Husserl, for instance - are rarely included. In Germany, the neo-Kantian
movement crystallized around the two "power centers": the "Marburg School" in
Marburg, a small university town in the state of Hessia north of Frankfurt, and
the "Southwest School" at the universities of Freiburg and Heidelberg.
Given its academic location - all the neo-Kantians were university professors or professional academics - the neo-Kantian movement is also a history
of successful university politics: neo-Kantianism in Germany soon exerted its
power over nearly all German-speaking universities (including Switzerland and
Austria), and its representatives were heavily involved in shaping hiring policies
and academic curricula. Around the turn of nineteenth century, neo-Kantianism
had attained what Jiirgen Habermas once called an "imperial stance" that lasted
until its near collapse after the First World War and its total disintegration in
Nazi Germany as of 1933. But its dissolution was in itself part of the legacy of
neo- Kantianism: many of the leading neo- Kantians were Jews and, not surprisingly, prosecuted by Hitler's fascist regime. The removal of the main neo-Kantian
philosophers from academia and from German culture - most of them were leftwing liberals anchoring the Weimar Republic in the values of the Enlightenment
- was a consequence that reflected more than just official anti-Semitic policies.
To many contemporaries, and Heidegger is here a good example of this attitude,
the neo- Kantians represented not only a dated model of philosophy; in addition, their liberal politics, also diffusely associated with "Jewishness;' reflected
a politics whose time had passed. When Heidegger, in a letter from 1929, railed
against the "jewification of the German spirit" (Verjudungdes deutschen Geistes),

(Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978). Brief overviews of the neo- Kantian movement can be found in Hans-Ludwig Ollig, Der Neukantianismus (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1979),
and Manfred Pascher, Einfiihrung in den Neukantianismus (Munich: UTB, 1997). A full- scale
account of the neo- Kantian movement does not exist to this day, although certain thinkers or
schools have been covered in greater detail. For work on the Marburg School, for example, cf.
the important works by Holzhey (see bibliography), and for an historical account, cf. Ulrich
Sieg, Aufstieg und Niedergang des Marburger Neukantianismus: Die Geschichte einer philosophischen Schulgemeinschaft (Wiirzburg: Kiinigshausen & Neumann, 1994). The account here
is indebted to and draws from all of these sources.
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we see that "to be Jewish" was more than a creed; it was a philosophical as well
as a political "lifestyle:'3
Due to their dominant position between 1890 and 1914, the neo-Kantians
were harshly attacked by nearly all the other philosophical movements that
emerged after the First World War, including phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie,
existentialism (Jaspers, the early Heidegger), and logical positivism. This critique
of what was perceived as the dominant philosophical school in Germany became
so much a part of the self-definition of these new tendencies that many, if not
most, new philosophical movements and ideas cannot be understood without
at least a basic knowledge of the neo -Kantian paradigms and theories that
they argued against. Defining one's own project vis-a-vis the neo- Kantians
became almost the modus operandi in many a philosopher's work, and we see
this in Husserl's transcendental-eidetic phenomenology, Scheler's value ethics,
Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, and Carnap's and the Vienna School's
attempt at a "truly" scientific philosophy.
In short, the history of late-nine tee nth- and early-twentieth-century philosophy cannot be adequately assessed without knowledge of neo-Kantianism. It
is curious, then, to note that for over forty years (essentially after the Second
World War) , neo -Kantianism has been largely ignored by scholarship. As of the
1980s, however, increasing attention in Europe has been directed toward the
work of the neo-Kantians and the importance of neo-Kantianism has also been
brought to the fore by some scholars in North America. It is to be anticipated
that neo-Kantianism will also become a widely discussed field of research in
the next decade in North America for scholars working in the history of philosophy, history and philosophy of science, philosophy of culture, and "continental
philosophy:' broadly construed. This revival "is evidenced by a good number of
international conferences held in the past decade not only in Germany, France,
and Italy, but also in the United States.
Despite the important role of neo- Kantianism in the philosophical landscape
of the time, it is, ironically, hard to point to any seminal works by any of the
major figures. Of these major figures, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm
Windelband, and Heinrich Rickert were the most famous, along with Ernst
Cassirer, whose writings were widely received and translated. This is not to say
that the literary output was not most impressive: all of these philosophers wrote
books at the rate at which most academics today write articles. Nevertheless,
some of the systematic approaches of the neo -Kantians have to be pieced together
through a synopsis of several works. This dearth of "seminal works" also has philosophical reasons; it has to do with the nature of the neo-Kantian movement itself

l

3. Quoted in Peter E. Gordon, "Neo-Kantianism and the Politics of Enlightenment;' The Philosophical Forum 39(2) (2008),235 .
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and the type of work that it did and promoted - despite all differences of outlook
and emphasis. Hence, to understand the distinct character of the neo-Kantian
movement, let us return to its origins in the then-contemporary political thought
and natural science.
Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75) and Otto Liebmann (1840-1912)
might both be considered "fathers" of neo-Kantianism. Lange published two
works in 1865, which became defining works for the nascent movement, Die
Arbeiterfrage (The worker question) and Geschichte des Materialismus (History of
Materialism), while Liebmann's Kant und die Epigonen (1865) was very popular
at the time. Both of Lange's books tackle the issue of the modern conditio
humana and the problems arising from humankind's situation in the industrial
age, which posed many new and hitherto unknown challenges (mass society,
the problem of the working class, etc.). Lange also participated in the Vereinstag
Deutscher Arbeitervereine, the German Workers' Association, an ancestor of the
German Social Democratic Party (the SPD). However, as the title Geschichte des
Materialismus indicates, Lange attempted to place these concrete problems into
a larger philosophical context. The problem was, in his opinion, "materialism"
and its disdain of human spirit and "idealistic" values in a broadly conceived
sense of the term, along with materialism's tendency to reduce humans to func tioning wheels in the machinery of modern industrial society. Hence, a decidedly political sense of "idealism" runs through neo- Kantianism. This tendency
led to interesting and - judging from political debate among social democrats
worldwide - still valid social-democratic ideas, which took hold especially in
the Marburg School. Both Hermann Cohen and Natorp, for example, promoted
what they called "social idealism" as an explicit rejection of a socialism stemming from the Marxist tradition. Thus, in reconstructing the origins of neoKantianism, one needs to keep in mind this political background and the societal
context that the neo- Kantians attempted to address in a Kantian vein, while
Marxist ideas were developing in elsewhere in Germany, England, and Russia.
The other origin, which connects more directly to Kant and hence constitutes
the general alliance with the Sage of Konigsberg and "Kantianism" in a broader
sense, came, interestingly enough, from within the natural sciences. Here scientists confronted the problems that arose once natural science became "scientific" in the modern sense of the term, and the speculative Naturphilosophie
of the German Idealists and the Romantics, especially Schelling,4 became an
object of ridicule. It was in fact a scientist - Hermann von Helmholtz (182194) - who, in his physical and optical experiments, discovered the influence of
the observer on that which was being observed. In his famous speech Ober das
*4. For a disc ussion ofScheUing, see the essay by Joseph P. Lawrence in The History ojContinental

Philosophy: Volume 1.
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Sehen des Menschen (On man's seeing, 1855), he attempted to formulate these
ideas in Kantian terms, claiming that "all cognition of reality must be derived
from experience:' In this manner, he thought that his study of the physiology
of the senses had confirmed in a scientific manner Kant's "organization of the
mind;' namely "that the manner of our perceptions is equally determined by the
nature of our senses as through external objects:'5 Hence, experimental natural
science seemed to confirm Kant's transcendental turn, without, however, the
idealist baggage that burdened both Kant and his idealist aftermath. Early neoKantian philosophers such as Cohen soon took up this challenge and placed
Helmholtz's ideas on a firmer philosophical foundation. While they welcomed
the fact that an experimental scientist had made the way "back to Kant;' they felt
that this move took place in the (problematic) spirit of naturalism. As a result,
the scientists' return to Kant received an enthusiastic reception on the part of
philosophers of the Kantian stripe, but the neo-Kantians also felt that this scientific return to Kant needed to be monitored carefully. The close connections to
the sciences became one of the trademarks of neo-Kantianism. In an unfavorable reading, which, however, became popular (and which one still finds quoted
today), neo- Kantianism was criticized in this vein for reducing philosophy to the
"handmaiden of the sciences:' While this description is, as we shall see, unfair,
it is true that the proximity to scientific endeavors and a reflection on the status
and nature of the sciences - both the natural and the human sciences - became
a dominant characteristic that defined and popularized neo-Kantian ideas.
Helmholtz's work exemplifies the rehabilitation of Kantian philosophy that
emerged from discussions within the sciences and the philosophy of science.
The call to return to Kant was soon taken up by philosophers or those - such
as Cohen, who started out as an experimental psychologist - who turned to
philosophy under this influence. Yet, once Kant had become re-established as an
eminent philosophical figure with whom to approach epistemological questions
in the sciences, another field of activity emerged that also helped to strengthen
the overall stance of the neo- Kantian movement within Germany, namely Kant
philology and Kant scholarship. With the development of rigorous philology in the
nineteenth century and new editorial techniques arose the inauguration of critical
Kant editions that adhered to these new standards. "Complete Works" editions
had up to then either not existed or were, for example, in the notorious case of
Hegel, not philologically sound in the light of contemporary editorial practices.
Under the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey, the Kant edition initiated by the Berlin
Academy of the Sciences, begun in 1900 and staffed by philosophers in the neoKantian vicinity - Erich Adickes, Benno Erdmann, and others - stands (for the
5. Quoted in Helmut Holzhey, "Der Neukantianismus;' in Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 12,
H. Holzhey and W. Rod (eds) (Mun ich: Beck, 2004), 3 1.
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most part) the test of modern editorial philology. The importance of this editorial work for the dissemination of Kant's philosophy cannot be overemphasized.
In addition to the Berlin edition, the late nineteenth century saw an impressive proliferation of commentaries on Kant's works. Some of the classical Kant
scholarship produced then - commentaries by Cassirer, Cohen, Hans Vaihinger,
and others - are to this day classics of Kant research. These basic readings defined
the main avenues in which Kant would subsequently be read. In other words,
what the neo-Kantians achieved, actively and conscientiously, was a canonization of Kant as he is perceived today: as the towering figure in modern philosophy. This is not to say that this status is not due to Kant's philosophy itself;
however, a writer needs a functioning "transmission belt" that conveys one's
thoughts to the readers. This is what the neo-Kantians achieved in an exemplary
manner. While this might seem tangential to the actual philosophical importance
of neo-Kantianism, it is indeed not to be dismissed, as it established both Kant
in the position seen today and, in turn, the neo- Kantians as the "true" heirs of
this seminal figure in the history of Western philosophy.
Since the neo-Kantian movement is anything but a unified school, we shall
now turn to the Marburg School and the Southwestern School, respectively, to
discuss their mutual contributions to modern philosophy. This short historical
overview will have to confine itself to these two main groups. 6

The Marburg School: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer
The Marburg School is the most "compact" group within neo- Kantianism,
judging from its self-understanding and outward projection. This unity is due to
the method that its founder, Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), developed out of his
Kant interpretation. This method is called the Transcendental Method, in recognition of Kant's method, although the term is itself not to be found in Kant's oeuvre.
This focus on method has led some to accuse the Marburg School of a "methodological fanaticism:'7 although we shall see that the method itself plays a crucial
role in the Marburg School's epistemological paradigm. Surrounded by a very
6. As mentioned, most philosophy departments in Germany and Austria were dominated
by neo-Kantians and to do justice to this movement as a whole one would have to discuss
figures whose names can merely be listed here: the largely independent Richard Honigswald
(!875-1947) in Breslau (Gadamer's first teacher there), later Munich; the critical realist Al ois
Riehl in Graz (1844-1924); the philosopher oflaw Leonard Nelson (1882-1927); Jonas Cohn
(1869-1947) in Freiburg; Bruno Bauch (1877-1942), the editor of Kant Studien; and for the
youngest generation of neo- Kantians after the Second World War, sometimes referred to as
"neo-neo-Kantians" (a somewhat excessive title), Richard Zocher (1887-1976), Hans Wagner
(1917-2000), and Wolfgang Cramer (1901 -74), father of Konrad Cramer (1933 -).
7. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Paul Natorp:' in Paul Natorp, Philosophische Systematik (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner, 2000).
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wide, national as well as international, circle of pupils and adherents, the main
figures of this group are Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp (1854-1924) and Ernst
Cassirer (1874-1945). Cassirer is sometimes not counted as belonging to the
Marburg School, although he is acknowledged to be one of the most significant
philosophers who emerged from the neo-Kantian tradition as a whole. Unlike
Cohen and Natorp, who were professorial colleagues at the University of Marburg
and formed a unique coalition of great influence both within and outside the
university, Cassirer was a generation younger and never actually taught in
Marburg. The offspring of a rich Jewish family with relatives in Berlin, Munich,
and Vienna, Cassirer rather disliked small-town life such as that of Marburg, a
city with a population of some 30,000 at the time. Still, for reasons to be discussed,
he deserves to be counted among the Marburg School and its method.
Cohen was by all accounts the dominant figure of this school; being also a
charismatic and irritable character,S he was the main attraction for students who,
after his arrival in Marburg in 1873, soon flocked around him. His ally Natorp
was initially one of them, but soon secured his own position at the university,
first as a librarian, then later, with Cohen's mentorship, as a professor. Cohen
taught in Marburg until his retirement in 1912. He spent his last years living in
Berlin teaching at the Lehranstalt fur die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Academy
for the Science ofJudaism), where he taught mainly on Judaism and the philosophy of religion and was influential on a newer generation of thinkers such as
Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber.9
Cohen first made a name for himself through his influential commentaries
on Kant's three Critiques. The commentary on the First Critique, entitled Kants
Theorie der Erfahrung (Kant's theory of experience), became especially influential for Kant scholarship as well as for th-e popularization of the "Marburg
Method:' Once these three voluminous commentaries were completed (1912),
Cohen turned to composing his own "System of Philosophy" in three volumes
analogous to Kant's Critiques - Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis (Logic of pure
8. As will become evident below in th e treatment of Cohen's closest collaborator, Natorp, they
seemed to have, as eyewitnesses report, polar opposite characters. Whereas Natorp was generally perceived as solid and reliable, Cohen seemed to have a choleric temper, which he did not
even attempt to keep under wraps and which was directed at different people and peoples.
To give just one example, Cohen, who discovered his Jewish roots after the Dreyfus affair,
despised assimilated Jews and did not hold back judgment. One person whom he vilified in
this way was, for instance, Husser!; see quotations from Cohen's correspondence with Natorp
in Sebastian Luft, "Reconstruction and Reduction: Natorp and Husser! on Method and the
Question of Subjectivity:' in Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, Sebastian Luft and
Rudolf Makkreel (eds) (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 84-5 n.3 _
9. For a historical account of Cohen's interesting life, see Helmut Holzhey, "Cohen and the
Marburg School in Context:' in Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism , Reinier Munk (ed.)
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2004).
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cognition), Ethik des Reinen Willens (Ethics of pure willing), and Asthetik des
Reinen Gefuhls (Aesthetic of pure sentiment) - which appeared between 1902
and 1912. A transitional work, but from a developmental standpoint crucial,
since it allowed Cohen to explicitly formulate his "transcendental method"
(the centerpiece of the Marburg School), was the small study Das Prinzip der
principle
of the infinitesimal
Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (The
.
.
method and its history). Cohen's system was supposed to be rounded off by
a fourth part, a psychology explicating the "unity of cultural consciousness;'
but Cohen passed away before beginning it. Shortly before his death, Cohen
completed his late manuscript on religion, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen
des Judentums (Religion of reason out of the sources of Judaism), which was
published posthumously and recently has attracted considerable attention in
the philosophy of religion and Jewish studies.
To understand Cohen's original approach culminating in the "transcendental
method;' one must first assess his Kant interpretation. The thesis that Cohen
boldly puts forth claims that with his Copernican turn Kant founded nothing less
than a new concept of experience. Experience is not mere perception or intuition,
but establishes laws about 'that which is experienced. In other words, according
to Cohen, the experience Kant is talking about is that of the scientist. Cohen
famously declares that Kant conceived his revolutionary Copernican turn as he
meditated on Newton's Principia Mathematica. "Not the stars in the heavens;' he
writes, "are the phenomena, but the astronomical data that the scientist establishes, these are the contents of experience:'lo The experience of the scientist, in
establishing laws of nature, thereby constructs nature as a mathematical universe.
For Kant, Newtonian physics exists and, because of its mathematical method,
is able to give rise to synthetic judgments a priori. In Cohen's interpretation,
Kant's question concerning the transcendental condition of the possibility of
a priori cognition is really concerned with the question of how those a priori
truths established in natural (physical) science become possible and how they
can be justified. The accepted cornerstone - which Kant called the factum that philosophy has to clarify is the "factum of the sciences" (das Faktum der
Wissenschaften) in which reality is constructed. Taking cues from the analytiC
method Kant pursues in the Prolegomena, this entails that philosophy's job is to
reconstruct the conditions of possibility through which this factum comes about.
The manner in which Cohen recasts Kant's transcendental turn is, essen tially, by rejecting the two stems doctrine (concepts and intuitions). His solution is Hegelian, as he grounds all knowledge and experience of reality in a
priori concepts. Reality as experienced is constructed through and through , and
10. Hermann Cohen, Kants Iheorie der Erfahrung (New York: Olms, [1871] 1987),20-21. All
translations fro m the German are my own.
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this construction occurs through the use of concepts that are applied to what is
experienced. Cohen grounds this premise on the discovery of the infinitesimal
in mathematics, according to which all entities are constructed in thought on
the basis of the category of the infinitesimally small. II Since these concepts are a
priori (Cohen prefers the word "pure"), reality as we encounter it is constructed
in pure thought. The task of philosophy is to lay the foundations of objective
knowledge in pure thought, but the laying of these foundations is modified by
scientific progress. That is, scientific progress makes new concepts necessary,
and since all scientific cognition is in principle falsifiable, the foundations themselves are subject to constant re-evaluation and scrutiny. Philosophy is no longer
a science of ultimate foundations (Grundlagenwissenschaft) - the traditional task
of metaphysics prior to Kant's transcendental turn - but is a science of laying
foundations (Grundlegungswissenschaft) in "pure thought:'
Cohen's transcendental method grounds all knowledge of the world in pure
thought. But Cohen's restatement of Kant's transcendental idealism operates on
the basis of an unacknowledged Hegelian influence. This influence consists in
the notion that the system of categories is not a "static" table of concepts, established once and for all, but something that evolves over time. This evolution, now
departing from Hegelian idealism, is not that of absolute spirit but of scientific
progress "on the ground:' Theoretical philosophy becomes a logic of categories
that have their origin in pure thought, and epistemology is recast as a "logic of
origin" (Ursprungslogik), in which self-generated categories in thought (as their
origin) become constituted as functional (not substantial) categories, forming
a web of relations as a matrix for orientation in thought. This is to say that
what Cassirer later formulated in his reconstruction of the shift from ancient to
modern science - the move from a substance to a functional ontology - in effect
already takes place in Cohen's logic. Cohen's late philosophy in his logic of origin
differs from Hegel's, accordingly, in that thought categories lay the foundations
for scientific thought. This logic is not, in other words, a "self-constructing path;'
as Hegel calls his method, but an a priori foundation of scientific thinking in
an a priori category system that is itself dynamic and ever-evolving. For Cohen,
philosophy is the justification of the factum that is already established (the mathematical sciences) and reconstructs their constructive activity, thereby justifying
the knowledge claims of the scientist.
This abbreviated discussion of Cohen's philosophical system - his ethics,
aesthetics, and political philosophy have been passed over l 2 - has focused on

11. See Hermann Cohen, Das Prinz ip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (Berlin:
Bruno Cassirer, 1883).
12. For more elaboration of his system, see Andrea Poma, Th e Critical Philosophy of Hermann
Cohen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997); Geert Edel, Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik
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the transcendental method that forms the nodal pOint around which the other
two significant thinkers of the Marburg School constructed their systems. The
principle of human beings' construction of reality provides the crucial element
for understanding this school. Reality, insofar as it is entirely constructed by the
activities of the human spirit, of which scientific thought is merely one, albeit
its most dignified, application, is the reality of humanity's cultural activities. The
Marburg School is in this sense unified as outlining an encompassing transcendental philosophy of culture. 13 In the Marburg reading, to quote Cassirer, Kant's
critique of reason is recast as a "critique of culture:'
Natorp, after wavering between pursuing a career as a classical philologist,
musician, or philosopher, finally came to focus on philosophy and moved to
Marburg to study under Cohen. Cohen soon incorporated him into his growing
group of collaborators. An avid student of the natural sciences and mathematics,
Natorp was probably the most erudite member of this school. He wrote on ancient
philosophy, ancient and modern science, social and political philosophy, and,
last but not least - since his Chair was also dedicated to pedagogy - pedagogical
philosophy, especially that of Heinrich Pestalozzi. A more agreeable character l4
and also a lucid writer - Cohen's writings were considered dense and difficult Natorp helped the Marburg School gain a broader acceptance and popularity than
Cohen himself would have been able to achieve. Given the openly anti-Semitic
sentiment in large parts of German society and especially German academia, it
is likely that, without Natorp on his side, Cohen, clearly the most innovative neoKantian, would have remained isolated and far less influential in the academic
landscape of his time. The Marburg School must be seen as constituted by both
individuals: Cohen, sometimes referred to as "minister of the exterior;' and
Natorp, dubbed "minister of the interior:' Together they formed a powerful alliance and a functioning collaboration that lasted more than a quarter century. IS
In addition to his writings on figures in t-he history of philosophy - most
notably Plato - and on special problems in the philosophy of science, Natorp
(Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1988); and the contributions in Hermann Cohen's Critical
Idealism, Reinier Munk (ed.) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004).
.
13. See Ursula Renz, Die Rationalitat der Kultur: Zur Kulturphilosophie und ihrer transzendentalen
Begrundung bei Cohen, Natorp und Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2002).
14. Cf. footnote 8 above for an illustration of Cohen's character. For an example of Natorp's
greater effect on the scientific community of his day, one can point out that nearly all statements of the Marburg School that were received in the philosophical and wider publiC
stemmed from Natorp's pen; for the logical method of the Marburg School, for example his
Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften (actually Cohen's domain), and for a
general, and popular, expression of the Marburg School as a whole, one should note that
Natorp's Philosophie: Ihr Problem und ihre Probleme (discussed in the main text above), was
first published in 1911 and was re-edited four times during Natorp's lifetime.
15. Cf. Sieg, Aufstieg und Niedergang des Marburger Neukantianismus.
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was also the only notable neo-Kantian who was able to write an unusually brief
(ISO pages) and bestselling treatise: Philosophie: Ihr Problem und Ihre Probleme
(Philosophy: its problem and its problems). This text, which is a lucid "mission
statement" of Marburg neo-Kantianism, has perhaps rightfully been considered the Programmschrift of the entire neo-Kantian movement. Yet Natorp's
initial fame was based on his influential 1903 work on Plato: Platos Ideenlehre:
Eine Einfuhrung in den Idealismus (Plato's theory of ideas: an introduction to
idealism). As the title indicates, Natorp's peculiar interpretation concerning
Plato's theory of the Forms is that it is really an epistemological position idealism - rather than a metaphysical one. More specifically, Natorp claims,
Plato's ideas are nothing but natural laws that govern physical entities. Laws are
that which make things what they are, what is "valid" about them. Soon after
its publication, this bold thesis was harshly criticized, since it seems to read
Newtonian physics and Kant's transcendental turn back into Plato's premodern
thought; but given the close alliance with modern science, this reading is perhaps
less surprising stemming from a Marburger than it first appears. In this sense,
Natorp's Plato is less a work of Plato exegesis than a restatement of the type of
idealism professed in the Marburg School. 16
Natorp's most substantial philosophical contribution to the Marburg School
was his psychology and concomitant theory of subjectivity. Dismissed by
Cohen - although not openly - Natorp's idea of a philosophical psychology
started out as a side project when he published in 1888 his short Einleitung in
die Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode (Introduction to psychology according
to critical method). This later turned into a full-fledged, yet ultimately abandoned, project when he published the "second edition" Allgemeine Psychologie
nach Kritischer Methode (General psychology according to critical method),
which had grown to 350 pages, more than three times its original size. In 1887,
he published the influential article "Ueber Objective und Subjective Begriindung
der Erkenntniss" (On objective and subjective grounding of cognition), where
he systematically laid out his idea of a philosophical- not experimental, as in the
Brentano and Wundt Schools - psychology.
Natorp's psychology grew directly out of problems that he saw with the transcendental method. If the latter is about constructing reality, all that this method
accounts for philosophically are the finished "products" such as scientific theories; these are the "outcome" of humanity's creative activity. In other words, all
16. It is interesting to note that Natorp somewhat recanted his earlier reading in a "MetacriticaJ
Appendix" of the second edition in 1921; cf. Plato's Theory of Ideas: an Introduction to Idealism,
Vasilis Politis and John Connolly (trans.) (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2004). For Natorp's
Plato interpretation and its importance for the Marburg School, cf. Karl -Heinz Lembeck,
Platon in Marburg: Platon-Rezeption und Philosophiegeschichtsphilosophie bei Cohen und
Natorp (Wlirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 1994).

57

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .~E

#

SEBASTIAN LUFT AND FABIEN C APEI LLE RES

that philosophy was to do was justify after the fact what the sciences were "always
already" doing. What was missing was an account of the creative, subjective
life that creates these cultural products. This should be, Natorp asserted, the
task of a critical psychology. Its purpose was, more precisely, to recover this
creative, subjective life by going in the opposite direction of the transcendental,
constructive method. That is to say, it should proceed reconstructively from the
finished products back to the creative life that was involved in their constructive
processes. Metaphorically, Natorp described the psychological, reconstructive
method as a "minus" vis-a-vis a "plus" direction on one and the same line. What
was to be regained would be this active, dynamic life that had come to a standstill
once cultural products had been formed . This method should remain faithful to
the essentially dynamic life of consciousness. All other psychological approaches
treated consciousness with objectifying methods; when reading accounts of
consciousness, Natorp complains, he feels as though he is walking through a
morgue instead of studying bodies filled with life. 17 The reconstructive method
was the method to finally overcome this problem. At the same time, given the
metaphor of the plus and minus directions, it is clear that the reconstructive
method is entirely dependent on the transcendental method; Natorp calls it its
"inverse" application. That is, the reconstructive method of psychology serves a
transcendental-philosophical function within the overall Marburg Method that
was to account for subjectivity in all of its dimensions - in its cultural products
and in its dynamic status nascendi - hence, psychology "according to critical
method:' Natorp's intention was not that this should replace or be in competition with experimental psychologies, but that it was intended to add a piece
within the overall transcendental epistemology that the Marburg School had
taken over from Kant, but which would remain incomplete unless this "subjective" part was supplied.
The subjective life, once it had been discovered through reconstruction,
Natorp frames in terms of what he calls "conscious-ity" (Bewusstheit). Through
this neologism he attempted to capture the very fact of "being conscious" of
conscious life, with its conscious contents. Moreover, his reconstructive method
would proceed genetically, that is, it would provide not static laws (of objectifying
science), but genetic accounts of the dynamic life of consciousness, going down
to the origins of consciousness where one cannot even speak of "consciousness"
any longer. In his late work, Natorp simply calls it "life." Other than these prin cipal philosophical insights, however, the actual results ofNatorp's psychology
were meager and Natorp himself abandoned the opposition between objective
17. Paul Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode (Tiibingen: M ohrlSiebeck, 1912),
16, 3 1. As Natorp explains there, an example of such "objectivist" treatment is the application
of the mechanistic model of natural caus~lity to the sphere of the psyche.
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and subjective methods in favor of a more deeply grounded "all-method" that
synthesized both subjectivist and objectivist methods. In his somewhat idiosyncratic late philosophical system, Natorp was seen to have departed from his
Marburg roots (as some critics, clearly under the influence of Heidegger, have
remarked), 18 and given this verdict, Natorp's late system has been vastly underappreciated. Challenging the fundamental assumptions of Kant's philosophy as
well as that of the Marburg School as a whole, the question as to how one should
ultimately interpret this school turns on the issue of whether it represents the
final fulfillment of Kant's intentions if one spells out the implications of transcendental philosophy, or whether it is a radical departure from the Kantian
paradigms. At any rate, his psychological method and his account of subjectivity
have had significant impact on other theories, including Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology of Dasein.
Cohen and Natorp formed such a close alliance that differences between
them tended to remain subdued and un articulated (either in public or even
between them).1 9 When Cohen left Marburg for Berlin in 1912, Natorp, who
remained in Marburg until his death in 1924, experienced something of a renaissance. In his lectures he developed his original philosophical system, which
he worked on until his last days. In his late thought he wanted to form an allencompassing method, incorporating mystical elements into a totalizing philosophical system. The manuscript, which was prepared for publication by Natorp
himself, remained unpublished until 1954. There has been some speculation that
the publication was discouraged at the time by Heidegger, who was professor in
Marburg as of 1921 and who was familiar with Natorp's latest developments. 2o
In fact, Natorp's last intuitions, which focused on the simple and original fact of
being simply being - the basic factum of the "es gibt" - bear some resemblance
to Heidegger's Seinsfrage.
The most important and also most influential individual for twentiethcentury philosophy stemming from the Marburg School was undoubtedly Ernst
Cassirer. He ingeniously picked up the main lines from his teachers Cohen and
Natorp, weaving them into his own philosophical system, while incorporating

18. Cf., for example, Christoph Von Wolzogen, Die Autonome Relation: Zum Problem der
Beziehung im Spatwerk Paul Natorps; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theorien der Relation
(Wiirzburg and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984), who also lists examples of such readings (von
Wolzogen himself reads Natorp in this Heideggerian manner as well).
19. Helmut Holzhey's Cohen und Natorp (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1986) does an excellent
job at shOwing where the differences between Cohen and Natorp lay.
20. Cf. von Wolzogen, Die Autonome Relation, who lists some quotations from Heidegger's corre·
spondence in support of this hypothesis. It would be, ironically, Gadamer, pupil of both
Natorp and Heidegger, who later favored the publication of this text, as witnessed by his
laudatory introduction "Paul Natorp:' in Natorp, Philosophische Systematik, xi-xviii.
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influences from such diverse fields as linguistics, anthropology, and other
("hard") sciences, such as contemporary physics. He was the most original and
also most prolific offspring of the Marburg School. Coming from a wealthy
family, he neither aspired to be a university professor, nor were his chances as
a Jew ever very good in German academia at the time. Nevertheless, he was
considered one of the strongest of his generation, earning his first recognition
as a historian of philosophy through his studies on Leibniz and Renaissance
and early modern thought. He was also involved in new editions of the works
of Leibniz and Kant. His monograph, Kant's Leben und Lehre (Kant's Life and
Thought), originally intended as the introductory essay to the Kant edition but
not published until after the First World War, has become a classic in Kant scholarship, while his four-volume Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und
Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit (The problem of knowledge in modern philosophy and science) is an excellent example of neo-Kantian Problemgeschichte.2 1
One would, however, not do justice to his philosophical originality - which
unfortunately has sometimes been the case - were he to be restricted to his early
work on the history of philosophy.
After the First World War, Cassirer did receive a call as professor (Ordinarius)
to the newly founded university of Hamburg, where he became Rektor (president) in 1929-30, the highest academic position that any Jew ever occupied in
Germany. Quickly reading the signs of the times, he and his extended family
left Nazi Germany in 1933. Cassirer emigrated first to England, then to Sweden,
where he fled from the Nazis anew as they invaded that country in 1941. He
was then invited to a visiting professorship at Yale, where he stayed for three
years. In 1944, he assumed another visiting appOintment at Columbia. Already
in failing health and highly distressed by the war reports, he died of a heart
attack on the streets of New York in 1945, shortly before the end of the Second
World War. It has been speculated that his influence, especially in the US, would
have been considerably stronger had he lived to see his original work, published
in German and only slowly becoming translated, come to fruition in the New
World. 22
Sometimes referred to as a watershed event in twentieth -century philosophy,
the famous encounter between Cassirer and Heidegger in the Swiss town of
Davos in 1929 must be mentioned. 23 During the annually held Hochschultage
21. See the section on Problemgeschichte below.
22. Cf. Michael Friedman, "Ernst Cassirer;' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004 (http://
plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ cassirer).
23. There is a smattering of literature on this event, beginning - at least in recent schol arship with Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago, IL:
Open Court, 2000) Cf. also the recent article by Gordon, "Neo-Kantianism and the Politics
of Enlightenment:'
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devoted to intellectual topics - in 1929, Kant's philosophy and its interpretatiOl} - Heidegger and Cassirer conducted a well-attended dispute regarding their
different interpretations of Kant's philosophy. In truth, it amounted to a showdown between the two most prominent philosophers of the time: Heidegger, who
had just published his groundbreaking Being and Time (1927); and Cassirer, who
had just published the third volume of his philosophical system, the voluminous
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. While formally centering on the interpretation of
Kant, the dispute was really about what, according to each, ought be considered
the main purpose and intention of philosophy at large: for Cassirer, liberating
the human being from his confinement in primitive and un-enlightened existence; for Heidegger, bringing human Dasein back into the "harshness and hardness of fate." Given the events that would ensue in Germany in 1933, Heidegger's
role in them, and the fascist ideology the German people came to embrace - the
country of the Dichter und Denker - it is not hard to see the wider and more
profound implications of this encounter. 24 This is not to say that these implications were clear at the time to those in the audience. However, in hindsight, this
encounter bears an almost eerie premonition of what was to come. The reasons
why contemporaries believed that Cassirer had been so thoroughly bested by
Heidegger cannot be spelled out straightforwardly either, but can perhaps best be
described as "atmosphericaI:' While the participants of the conference spent all
day indoors debating, and dressed formally for the evening reception, Heidegger
spent the days (presumably when he was not part of the program) skiing and
showed up at the reception in his ski overalls, in total disregard of social etiquette.
The "hardness of being" of the young and energetic Heidegger clashed against the
bourgeois Cassirer, who seemed to be "in agr~ement with everything:'25 implying
weak compromises reminiscent of the politics of the Weimar Republic, which
compromised itself out of existence.
Regarding Cassirer's character, it has been described as conciliatory and
"Olympian:' which extends to his writings. These display a remarkable lucidity
and, at the same time, philosophical modesty. At times the philosophical core of
his argument can be lost in the wealth of historical erudition that accompanies
24. This dispute is published as "Davos Disputation Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger;' in Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Richard Taft (trans.)
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997). For important essays on this encounter,
see Dominic Kaegi and Enno Rudolph (eds) , Cassirer-Heidegger: 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000). Among those who travelled to Davos to witness this
encounter were Rudolf Carnap, Eugen Fink, Herbert Marcuse, Joachim Ritter, Leo Strauss,
Leon Brunschvicg, Emmanuel Levi nas, Jean Cavailles, and Maurice de Gandillac.
25. In a telling anecdote, reported in Gordon, "Neo-Kantianism and the Politics of Enlightenment;'
223ff., students put on a mock debate between Heidegger and Cassirer one evening. Cassirer
was played by the young Levinas, who supposedly let flour (= dust) trickle out of his sleeves,
repeating the phrase "Ich bin mit all em einverstanden" (I agree with everything).
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his accounts. Most of his writings focus on other thinkers and their theories,
and he is content to raise philosophical issues in those contexts. Cassirer's first
original contribution to critical philosophy, which came fairly late in this young
shooting star's career, was his Substanz- und Funktionsbegriff (Substance and
Function),26 which appears to discuss a seemingly remote problem in scientific
concept formation, but in fact raises an issue that will be the cornerstone of his
philosophical systematic: the distinction between a substantial and functional
ontology and its epistemological implications. This basic insight, stemming from
the groundwork laid by Cohen, was cashed out in his three-volume Philosophy
oj Symbolic Forms. In addition to these substantial tomes, Cassirer wrote the
four-volume study The Problem of Knowledge in Modern Philosophy and a wide
array of articles and smaller studies on mythology, linguistics, modern physics,
and intellectual history. Once in the United States, he summarized his system
in the popular book An Essay on Man (written in English). His last work, The
Myth oj the State, offers a penetrating critique of modern fascism based on his
interpretation of the role of myth in the hierarchy of cultural achievements and
its relation to modern totalitarianism.
Returning to his first systematic work, Substance and Function, Cassirer,
taking his cue from Cohen's paradigm of construction, traced the constructive
activity of the human mind in the distinction between substantive and functional concepts in scientific nomenclature. Opposed to a substantial paradigm
in which, following Aristotle's substance ontology, concepts mirror things as
substances, a new type of concept formation has taken hold in modernity: that
of functional concepts. Functional concepts place the objects that they mirror
into a junction, as in mathematical functions (j(x». What functional concepts
mirror, then, are not substantial things, but functions, that is relations. Being
a function means that the functional concept formation actually constructs the
object of a particular scientific endeavor. Hence, Cassirer discovered Cohen's
constructive principle at the heart of scientific concept formation itself.
Whereas Substance and Function is largely a historical and programmatic
work, drawing on critical reflections on late-nineteenth-century physics and
mathematics by Richard Dedekind (1831-1916), Pierre Duhem (1861 - 1916),
Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-94), and Heinrich Hertz (1857-94) as evidence
for the core theme of functional concept formation, Cassirer subsequently
wrote two monographs analyzing the revolutionary physical theories of the
first half of the twentieth century - general relativity and quantum mechanics
- as manifestations of this new mode of concept formation. Zur Einstein'schen
26. Published in English with a translation of his Zur Einstein'schen Relativitatstheorie, in
Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, William Curtis Swabey & Marie
Collins Swabey (eds) (New York: Dover, 1953).
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Reiativitiitstheorie (1920; published in English as "On Einstein's Theory of

Relativity: Considered from the Epistemological Standpoint" as a supplement
to Substance and Function) identified the postulate of general covariance - that
the laws of physics are the same in all reference frames , hence that the objects
of fundamental physics must be represented as tensor expressions, valid in all
coordinate systems - as a novel principle of objectifying unity, a significant
further step away from anthropomorphic thing concepts toward an abstract
and purely geometrical concept of object. Cassirer's epistemological examination of quantum mechanics, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics,
written while in exile in Sweden in 1936, points to Heisenberg's uncertainty
relations and quantum statistics as even more striking transformations of the
concept of object, where the old classical notions of physical state and individual
identity are transformed, acquiring functional form. The thrust of each of these
two works is an insistence that the concept of object in physics is subordinate
to that of physical law, and accordingly that "objectivity or objective reality, is
attained only because and insofar as there is conformity to law - not vice versa:'27
But this was only Cassirer's first step. For, Cassirer asserted, such a constructive activity is not present just in scientific concept formation - an activity of
the human spirit, to be sure - but in all cultural activities. Construction is, in
other words, a form of interpretation of something that could be completely
different depending on the manner in which it is constructed. The sine curve
(Cassirer's example) in the mathematical context is, in an artistic manner of
seeing, an ornament, and may represent any number of other contexts. Prior to
such an interpretation - any interpretation - the thing is simply nothing for us.
What a thing is depends on its context, and th~ context is something constructed
through the human mind. Cassirer calls the agent of this activity spirit. That
which is constructed, or the medium of construction, he calls, nodding to
Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic;' a form. There is no simple object given (as
a substance or substratum) that then receives a supervening interpretation, but
there are only objects-in-contexts. There is no "raw" datum. The term for such
an object within a form Cassirer takes over from his favorite author, Goethe,
in calling it a symbol. Cassirer therefore calls his system that of sy mbolic forms.
They are the forms of manifestation into which human spirit's activity becomes
27. Ernst Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Mo dern PhysiCS: Historical and Systematic
Studies of the Problem of Causality, O. Theodor Benfey (trans.) (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, [1936J 1956), 132. By showing that there is continuous progress toward
pure Signification in the process of objectification in physics, this book also rebuked the Nazis'
characterization of relativity and quantum physics as "Jewish" and "degenerate" science. The
authors would like to thank Thomas Ryckman for his suggestions on how to treat this issue.
Interested readers should consult Ryckman's The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics
1915-1925 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) .
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filled. Indeed, we live in a plurality of meaningful "contexts:' The three symbolic
forms that Cassirer discusses in his magnum opus are language, myth, and scientific cognition. They are products of human spirit's productive-constructive
activity. His adaptation of the transcendental method traces the manner of
construction in each form, respectively, while breaking with Cohen's exclusively
scientific-logistic paradigm. The modes of construction in each form are more
freely described as different "logics" inhering in them. Cassirer's system can also
be described as a methodology of symbolic formation; thus, he is decidedly a
methodological pluralist. But his methodological pluralism is incomprehensible without the fundamental constructive paradigm that is the signature of
the "Marburg Method:'
Owing to his systematizing work in describing symbolic formation in
different cultural contexts, his writings have become influential for several
sciences, both human (anthropology, linguistics, aesthetics) and natural (such
as physics). Before leaving Cassirer, a brief comment on his interpretation of
fascism is in order. The Myth of the State rivals other classical texts dealing with
fascism in the twentieth century. In his interpretation of the rise of fascism in
the twentieth century, he argues that the phenomenon of fascism is the result
of political propaganda that has allowed myth to re-enter the political arena,
making porous the borders between responsible, rational action and mythical
power. Myth, once overcome by Greek enlightenment, raises its ugly head once
political discourse has become corrupted in a manner that allows mythical
elements - Hitler, the "divine Fuhrer;' the myth of the superior ''Aryan Race;'
and so on - to dominate political, democratic discourse.

The Southwest School: Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask
The Southwest School is much less cohesive than the Marburg School; even
the name "Southwest" indicates that this "movement" (to speak of a school is
perhaps exaggerated) was localized in different university towns - Heidelberg
and Freiburg im Breisgau, respectively.28 The main representatives were Wilhelm
Windelband (1848-1915) and his pupil Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) . An
important member of this movement was Emil Lask (1875-1915), arguably the
most interesting but also most difficult philosopher of this group and of significant influence for, among others, the young Heidegger. He died prematurely,
however, in the trenches during the First World War. His "logic of philosophy"
is a metaphilosophical category system for philosophy itself that, while highly
28. The Southwest School is sometimes also referred to as the "Baden School" after the state of
Baden, part of the German Empire; the state was incorporated after the Second World War
and is now called "Baden-Wiirttemberg:'
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original, is arguably a departure from neo- Kantianism in its Southwest mode
and will not receive further discussion here. 29
The Southwesterners were quite successful at their respective universities and
shaped several generations of students. Windelband, for instance, was professor
in Zurich, Freiburg, and Strasbourg (then German territory), before settling into
Heidelberg, where he lived from 1903 until his death. Rickert became professor
in Freiburg in 1896 before receiving a call to Heidelberg in 1916 to succeed
Windelband, who had died the year before. Despite a mental illness that prohibited Rickert from making public appearances (he suffered from agoraphobia), he
nevertheless exerted a substantial influence through his - often polemical and
piercing - writings.3o While more loosely affiliated than the Marburg School,
Rickert and Windelband nevertheless worked with certain core ideas that they
. shared, while not at all times agreeing in all details. Since their philosophical
efforts displayed less of a systematic progression than the work of the members
of the Marburg School, we shall be presenting the Southwest School in terms of
their shared core ideas.3l
(i) Writing the history of philosophy as a history ofproblems (Problemgeschichte)
Windelband, while best known as a historian of philosophy, is unfairly reduced
to a historian insofar as he devised a new way of doing the history of philosophy, namely as the history of problems. While this might seem inconsequential
today, to understand the history of philosophy as a development of philosophical
problems was at the time quite innovative. Win del band's historiological method
took the emphasis away from individual philosophers and a quasi-biographical
reconstruction of their work and placed that emphasis instead on the rich historical "horizon" that provided a historical-scientific-philosophical setting in
which these philosophers worked. This setting is the process in which "European
humanity" exposes its view of world and life (Welt- und Lebensauffassung). It is
not a Hegelian scenario, in which history is the process of increasing knowledge
of freedom , but rather a process in which thinkers and scientists communicate
and interact. In this historical process, there are relevant factors that need to

29. For an excellent treatment of Lask, see Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space
of Meaning: Paths Towards Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University·Press,2001).
30. Rickert's reputation at the time indicates th e Significance of the acknowledgment given to the
phenomenological movement when Husserl received the call to Freiburg in 1916 to succeed
Rickert.
3l. While the members of the Southwest School were no less respected in German academia
than the Marburgers, their philosophical legacy has dwindled to nearly zero insofar as their
achievements have become so much a part of the received idea of philosophical work that
they can well be considered trivial.
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- Wiss~nschaJten - peculiar to the English ear, meaning, literally translated,
"knowledge-doms:' Such a distinction undercuts that of rational and empirical sciences and is indeed an advance over it. But such a distinction, although
widely acknowledged in Windelband's day, rests on ontological assumptions
concerning the ontic regions of nature and spirit that present a problem. The
science that reveals the problem with this distinction is psychology: what kind
of science is one to group it under? As it has the human psyche as its object, one
would be inclined to call it a human science. Yet insofar as its goal is experimentally verifiable general results, it has the character of a natural science.
Here Windelband intervenes with an attempt to undercut this distinction. Arguing that all sciences, insofar as they treat objects of experience, are
empirical, the only questions are how and as what to interpret these empirically
ascertained results. This new distinction between how and as what is not an
ontological one, but - in good Kantian fashion - a methodological one. The
focal points of cognition are, generally, the individual or the general. Both are,
however, not absolute but merely relative terms. Scientific cognition oscillates
between these extreme focal points when interpreting its findings . The scientific
cognition of something individual Windelband calls idiographic (Le. describing
the individual, singular), that of something general, nomothetic (i.e. positing
the general, lawlike). "The latter are sciences of laws [GesetzeswissenschaJten],
the former are sciences of events [EreigniswissenschaJten]; the latter teach what
is always the case, the former what occurred only once:'36 For instance, if one
wants to, as a historian, work on the French Revolution, one has to describe
the individual characters and individual events that took place, and so on. On
the other hand, if one wants to understand, as a chemist, the manner in which
certain chemicals react together, one has to find out the general laws by which
they function and react - always and in a reliable, repeatable pattern. But neither
rests on an ontological premise. Indeed, the nomothetic and idiographic standards can be applied to one and the same ontic field. The classic example for this,
according to Windelband, is the science of organic nature:
As systematics, it is of nomothetic character, insofar as it describes
the always fixed types of living creatures, which have been experienced within the millennia of human observation as their lawlike
form. As developmental history, where it presents the order of earthly
organisms as a process of descent and transformation of species [i.e.
in evolutionary theory] ' " there it is an idiographic discipline. 37

36. Ibid. , 145.
37. Ibid., 146.
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different
cisms from, among others, Dilthey and Husserl, both of whom , albeit for
r object of
reasons, rejected this distinction when it came to describing the prope
pment
the human sciences. For Dilthey, a description of huma n historical develo
iews and
need not be only idiographic, but instea d could posit types of worldv
to choose
typical charac ter forms (i.e. types, not laws), and hence need not have
38
an eidetic
between individual and universal accounts. And Husserl's attempt at
us"
science of subjectivity goes even further, asserting the possibility of a "rigoro
nological
(Le. a priori) science of subjectivity after the transc enden tal-ph enome
is predreduct ion. Finally, Heidegger's sketch of a herme neutic of factical Dasein
the indiicated on a wholesale rejection of the (Platonic) distinc tion between
again we
vidual and the universal that underlies Winde lband's account. Here
ophy is ex
see that the influence of neo- Kantianism on twenti eth-ce ntury philos
negativo, as the seminal philosophers menti oned here derive their metho dolog
ical paradigms from a rejection of this Winde lbandi an distinction.
(iii) Philosophy as value theory

the life of
The idea of an idiographic science as the prope r metho d of accessing
lizing
spirit or human culture was cashed out especially in Rickert's work. Radica
as equally
Windelband, instea d of seeing idiographic and nomot hetic sciences
the nomoviable metho ds for cognition, Rickert privileges the idiographic over
of value 39
thetic sciences. Informed by Rudol f Herm ann Lotze's philosophy
values - Lotze alleges that Plato's ideas ought proper ly to be conceived as valid
object
Rickert asserts in his influential work Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (The
The History of Con tinel1tal
*38. See the discussion of Dilthey in the essay by Eric Sean Nelson in
Philosophy: Volume 2.
philosophers of the second
39. Rudolf Herman n Lotze (181 7-8 1) was one of the leading German
(he completed a
half of the ninetee nth century. A specialist in logiCand philoso phy of biology
at Giittingen
taught
he
1838),
in
Leipzig
at
degree
medical degree along with his philosophy
1844.
in
for almost forty years, beginni ng
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of cognition; first published in 1891 and re-edited six times, each time vastly
reworked) that all cognition is in essence a form of valuing. Accepting Kant's
thesis of the primacy of practical reason, this primacy asserts itself, according
to Rickert, already in the field of cognition insofar as cognizing is not a passive
apprehending but a forming of the object of cognition as something to be integrated into culture, that is, the world of values. At stake, for Rickert, is nothing
less than a redefinition of the traditional task of epistemology. The object that
is represented in cognition is not something independent of its being cognized,
but is something that is beingformed by the subject. Transcendent reality, which
to Kant was always mind-independent, is therefore dependent on the cultur. ally creative subject. This, concomitantly, changes the traditional notion of the
cognizing subject as "we must form a different notion of the cognizing subject
as only representing consciousness and, consequently, also a different notion
of the object and the measure of cognition as that of a transcendent reality."40
Given these two poles of cognition, one can approach the problem from both
the subjective and objective sides. The subjective path leads to a transcendental
psychology, the objective one to a transcendental logic; both are disciplines
within transcendental philosophy. However, the empirical approach to the object
of cognition remains valid in the empirical sciences; Rickert thus maps Kant's
idealism-realism distinction onto that of philosophy and the empirical sciences.
This dual approach is Rickert's restatement of Kant's transcendental idealism.
In his second famous work, Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen
Begriffsbildung (The limits of concept formation in natural science; first published
in 1896), Rickert expands on the epistemological foundations while also drawing
from Windelband's idiographic-nomothetic dist~nction. As the title indicates,
concept formation in the natural sciences has limitations. It leads, if pursued to
its extreme, into a purely naturalistic worldview. Contrary to Windelband, who
considered both idiographic and nomothetic forms of scientific research to be
on a relative scale (Le. their difference was only a matter of degree), Rickert
emphasizes the fundamental difference between them and goes on to favor the
idiographic method. Nomothetic research winds up in a dangerous abstrac tion that threatens to cover up or make obsolete the historical life of culture
(here anticipating Husserl's famous critique of the mathematization of science
in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology).
This is the negative part of this work. The positive is Rickert's description of
the inner functioning of the human or cultural sciences. What makes them
distinctly scientific in their own right is that they establish a relation to supraindividual values. Values, to Rickert, are neither physical nor mental, but are
40. Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einfiihrung in die Transzendentalphilosophie
(Tiibingen: Mohrl Siebeck, [1892J 1928),2.
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"located" in an altogether different "third realm;'41 where entities do not exist
but hold valid (gelten). This realm is ontologically distinct from either the physical or the mental insofar as they both are forms of being, while the ontological
status of values is their validity. Cultural scientific judgments, then, are characterized by making reference to this "world" of values. Hence the peculiarity of
cultural scientific work is not primarily that it focuses on the individual - this
is, as it were, taken for granted - but instead that in this individual attention it
makes a connection to an independently existing realm of valuesY This realm,
moreover, is in itself systematically organized. Correct cultural as well as moral
judgments can be discerned in their adequacy to the systematic hierarchy and
order of values. Cultural or spiritual sciences are expressions of the ideal order
of values. Therefore, the task of philosophy is to draft and describe this ideal
system of values. In his later years, Rickert drafted a "system of values" based on
the distinction of six different fields of values: logic, aesthetics, mysticism, ethics,
the erotic, and philosophy of religion. 43 The true meaning of transcendental
philosophy is thus redeemed in this draft of a system of values. Rickert began
composing this sketch in his System der Philosophie (System of philosophy), of
which only volume one appeared, and which has remained - despite Rickert's
reputation in Germany at the time -largely ignored. 44

II. NEO-KANTIANISM IN FRANCE

French neo-Kantianism emerged as the result of a conjunction of events
including the demise of Victor Cousin's eclecticism under the "authoritarian"
first period of the Second Empire (1851-60) and the development of spiritualism 45 under the "liberal" second period of the Empire. As a result of a very
dense network of friendships, the extreme centralization of political power, and
41. Rickert also calls this realm - much earlier than 1933! - das Dritte Reich . the "Third Reich:'
I just mention this in order to clear up any confusion on the part of a stumped reader. The
term was not exclUSively used by the neo- Kantians; for instance. it was also used - in the same
sense - by Frege.
42. In connecting the individual human being to the universal realm of values. Rickert is close to
Cassirer's cultural anthropology. which defines the human being as a cultural being precisely
in its capacity to lift itself out of the realm of nature and to become part of the world of spirit.
which is intersubjective and universal.
43. Cf. Ollig. Der Neukantianismus. 63 .
44. For a late recognition of Rickert's systematic philosophy. see Christian Krijnen. Nachm etaphysischer Sinn: Eine Problemgeschichtliche und Systematische Studie z u den Prinz ipien der
Wertphilosophie Heinrich Rickerts (Wiirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann. 2001) .
' 45. "French Spiritualist Philosophy" is discussed in the essay by F. C. T. Moore in The History of
Continental Philosophy: Volume 2.
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influential universities such as the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) and the
Sorbonne, neo-Kantianism became the predominant philosophical trend in
French academia under Victor Duruy's tenure as minister of education (186369). Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) and Jules Lachelier (1832-1918) initiated
this trend, establishing two general and distinct forms that were never unified.46
Renouvier's works offer a system divided into the classical divisions of general
and formal logic, rational psychology, and principles of natureY In his Essais de
critique generale (Essays in general critique), he writes: "I frankly confess that'r
follow in Kant's footsteps:'48 This Kantian program is described in general terms:
"the analysis and the coordination of the principles of knowledge in general, and
46. The best studies of French philosophy between 1850 and 1930 are Isaac Benrubi, Contemporary
Thought of France, Ernest B. Dicker (trans.) (London: Williams & Norgate, 1926), and Michel
Espagne, En defa du Rhin: L'Allemagne des philosophes franfais au XIXe siecie (Paris: Editions
du Cerf, 2004). In English, John Alexander Gunn, Modern French Philosophy: A Study of the
Development since Comte (London: T. F. Unwin, 1922), has some interesting inSights but, as
Bergson noted, lacks a clear and firm guiding thread. The translation of Benrubi, Les Sources
et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933), seems to
be based on a shorter and schematic German version. Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), although interesting, is
very partial, uses arguable classifications, and contains many inaccuracies: although different
forms of Kantianism are mentioned, there is no analysis of the exchanges with Germany, a
conceptually, institutionally, and politically essential point. Renouvier is not a spiritualist, he
did not study at the ENS with Ravaisson, but was a student at the Ecole Polytechnique, an
important element for his scientific background and his relation to positivism, since this is
how he met Comte. Hegel was indeed translated before the middle of the twentieth century:
Charles Benard translated the Lectures on Aesthetics in 1855, Augusto Vera's translation of
the Encyclopaedia was published from 1859 to 1869, a fact that should be added to the file
regarding Cousin's essential relation to Hegel, as well as Hippolyte Taine's. In TwentiethCentury French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers (Malden, MA : Blackwell, 2006), Schrift's
description of how the French system of education functions is fundamental and unique
in English. Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding
(trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) offers a witty picture of the latter
trends in French philosophy (structuralisms, essentially), although the subtlety of the analysis
as well as its irony may make it a difficult read for the unadvised reader.
47. On Renouvier, see Laurent Fedi, Le Probleme de la connaissance dans la philosophie de Ch.
Renouvier (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999); Octave Hamelin, Le Systeme de Renouvier (Paris: J.
Vrin, 1927); William Logue, Charles Renouvier, Philosopher of Liberty (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1993). For Renouvier's conception of science and use of the
hypothesis, cf. Warren Schmaus, "Kant's Reception in France: Theories of the Categories in
Academic Philosophy, Psychology and Social Sciences;' Perspective on Science 11(1) (2003).
Schmaus's "Renouvier and the Method of Hypothesis;' Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 38 (2007), is also iI\teresting concerning the kind of neo -Kantianism that developed in
France, and the typically neo-Kantian and phenomenological problem of the Kategorienlehre
(doctrine of categories).
48. Charles Renouvier, Essais de critique gemirale (Paris: Lagrange, 1854-64), xv. Hereafter quotations from this foreword will be cited parenthetically by page number. Unless otherwise
mentioned, all translations from the French are my own.
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of those that the established sciences put at their foundations without making
them explicit" (xx). The principles to which Renouvier refers are construed
as fundamental a priori relations that constitute knowledge. Starting with
the concept of representation in a very broad sense, Renouvier untangles its
elements and the laws ruling knowledge. He is thereby led to rewrite the Kantian
system of categories.
The Kantian inspiration is clear, and the influence of the forewords to the
Critique of Pure Reason, in particular that of the second edition, is obvious. The
question of the scientificity of philosophy is the guiding thread: "It is impossible to reasonably reject the Critique. For it is inspired by the spirit of science;
it is that very spirit" (xii). For Renouvier, as for Kant, the Critique is opposed to
traditional metaphysics, which was informed by theology and cosmology. As
will soon be the case for the German neo-Kantians, Renouvier sees the Critique's
scientific character in its methodological dimension: "If the result of the Critiq ue
is to formulate a method, to provide a lasting logic, this is indeed very much;
it is almost enough for its scientificity" (xiii). But a notable difference between
Renouvier and the German neo-Kantians, especially the Marburg School, is that
for Renouvier it is not so much that the Critique as such is the method (as Kant
wrote in the B Foreword); rather, the method is the result of the Critique (namely,
the ensuing Kantian methodologies themselves).
Nevertheless, Renouvier is quite critical of Kant. His last book, Critique de la
doctrine de Kant (Critique of the Kantian doctrine), offers a systematic deconstruction of the Critique of Pure Reason. In Renouvier's idealism, as, arguably,
in the Marburg School's idealism, the return to Leibniz49 is nearly as important
as the return to Kant. 50 But the very essence of Renouvier's concept of the transcendental remains deficient and psychological when compared to that found in
more elaborate Kant interpretations, as well as in the main German neo- Kantian
schools and Husserl's phenomenology.
Renouvier never taught and was extremely prolific. His influence was felt,
however, only after 1867, the year he founded, with his friend Franyois Pilion,
the journal L'Annee philosophique (The philosophical yearbook). At that time
49. In 1899, Renouvier published his La Nouvelle monadologie. A Leibnizian reconstruction
of Kant relies on a long history, going back to Salomon Maimon's interpretation of Kant's
Anticipations of Perception as an unconscious sum of "petites perceptions:' Cohen's rejection
of sensitive intuition relies on a similar conception. It is here important because in French
neo-Kantianism, and particularly in the philosophy of mathematics, it will give birth to a
strong opposition between the Kantian philosophy of intuition (Boutroux, Poincare) and the
Leibnizian philosophy of the concept (Couturat, Cavailles).
50. This is a reason, among others, that it caught the attention of Cassirer; cf. Ernst Cassi rer, "Oas
Problem des Unendlichen und Renouviers 'Gesetz der Zahl:" in Philosophische Abhandlungen:
Hermann Cohen zum 70. Geburtstag Dargebracht (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912), and "Review
of Ch. Renouvier, Essais de critique generale:' Die Geisteswissenschaften 1 (1914).
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he started to have followers: Fran<;:ois Evellin, the young Victor Brochard, JeanJacques Gourd, and his main disciple, Octave HamelinY It is also during this
period that William James carefully read his work.
If Renouvier's neo-Kantianism can be described as a neocriticism insofar as
it submits Kant himself to critique, Lachelier's can be described as a late evolution of spiritualism. His teacher, Felix Ravaisson (18l3-1900), established an
intellectual and institutional strain that would develop into Bergson's spiritualism as well as Emile Boutroux's neo-Kantianism. Ravaisson favored Schelling
over Hegel, a preference that meant, in the French context, leaping over Cousin
to return to Maine de Biran. True idealism is a spiritualism grounded in the
will. Lachelier depicted, quite accurately, the intellectual situation framed by
Ravaisson's Report (1868). As he writes in a letter to Paul Janet, on December
8,1891:
It is Ravaisson, I believe, who taught us all to conceive being not as
objective forms of substances or phenomena, but as the subjective
form of spiritual action, this action being - in its last resort - thought
or will. I think you could find this idea in Bergson, in Ribot even,
as well as in Boutroux and myself. It is perhaps the only trait that is
common to all of us and that makes for the unity of the philosophical
movement of the last twenty years. 52

With such a common ground, how can one account for the fragmentation of
spiritualism into Christian philosophy, Bergsonism, and neo-Kantianism?

51. Victor Brochard's (1848-1907) doctoral dissertation, De l'erreur (Paris, 1879), claims the
influence of Kant and Renouvier. This is also the case for Franc;:ois Evellin's (1835-1910)
dissertation: lnfini et quantite (Paris: Germer Bailliere, 1880). Jean-Jacques Gourd (18501909) was one of Renouvier's followers in Switzerland (see his Le Phenomene [Paris: Felix
Alcan, 1888]). Octave Hamelin (I856-1907), the most prominent of Renouvier's followers,
first exerted his influence by teaching at the University of Bordeaux (1884-1903), at the ENS
(1903-7), and at the Sorbonne (1905-7). His acclaimed book, Essai sur les elements principaux
de la representation (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907; doctoral thesis), as well as his translation and
commentary of Aristotle Physics II (complementary dissertation) were published the year of
his death. Leon Robin, his student and another of the Sorbonne's major figures, published
two thick volumes of Hamelin's lectures: Le Systeme de Descartes (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911 ;
with a foreword by Hamelin's friend Emile Durkheim), and Le Systeme d'Aristote (Paris: Felix
Alcan, 1920; lectures given at the ENS in 1904-5). Indicative of his importance, other courses
were later published, including Le Systeme de Renouvier (Sorbonne, 1906-7), Les Philosophes
presocratiques (Strasbourg: Association des publications de l'universite de Strasbourg, 1978;
lectures 1905-6), and Fichte (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1988; lectures
1887).
52. Jules Lachelier, Lettres, 1856-1918 (Paris: G. Girard, 1933),139.
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In 1861, Lachelier dissociated himself from Biran and hence from Ravaisson
as well. 53 His courses on logic and on psychology demonstrate that he had
already taken a Kantian position when he began teaching at the ENS. He exerted
his remarkable influence through his lectures rather than through his - relatively
few - publications.
The lectures on logic present a general elucidation of the theoretical principles of knowledge. From the very first lesson, the method is imbued with
Kantian elements. "Let me explain: in any science one can differentiate what
man knows and the way he knows, in other words, matter and form:'54 Both
in his Lectures on Logic and in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had already
made use of this conceptual distinction between logic in general (which is purely
formal) and transcendental logic, which is both formal and material. Lachelier's
lecture course then pursues a Kantian path. To circumscribe science, Lachelier
takes a detour: "instead of saying in a few words what science is, it might be
better to review the necessary conditions of science, the degrees spirit covers to
reach science:'55 This path is very significant, for he borrows the conditions for
science from the Critique ofPure Reason. The first condition for science is that an
object is given. Lachelier takes an indirect path to introduce both forms of pure
intuition, space and time: "the internal world of the successive states in time,
the outside world of the simultaneous objects in space and also the successive
states of these same objects in time:'56 Lachelier notes that space is integrated
in time and, when dissociating the internal world from the external, he also
intends to make room for that internal world that differs from the internalization of the external. A place is therefore reserved for feeling, desire, faith, and so
on, opening the possibility for the fields of morality and religion, while avoiding
a reductionist reading of Kant.
Sensation alone does not explain the possibility of science, since it is reduced
to an indefinite number of atomistic elements: "impression, in itself, is reduced
to an infinity of elementary impreSSions that is tied together by nothing and in
which it vanishes:'57 Knowledge is constituted by a synthetic act of spirit, an
intellectual synthesis that consists in the positing of pure relations. In addition
to space and time, pure functions of synthesis are acknowledged as transcendental conditions of science. And when, in the middle of the chapter on induction, Lachelier intends to ground the determinism expressed by scientific law
53. Cf. Gaston Mauchaussat, L'Idealisme de Lachelier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1961), 16-40.
54. Jules Lachelier, Cours de logique, Ecole Normale Superieure 1866-67 (Paris: Editions Universitaires de France, 1990), 15.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57 . Ibid., 16.
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and experimental method such as Claude Bernard58 conceives it, he again refers
to Kant, correcting the subjectivistic interpretation of the idealism:
And, although it is attributed to Kant to have reduced the principles
of understanding to a purely subjective value, it is to him that we
owe the justification of the principle of determinism. We cannot
know a priori things in themselves, but we can assert a priori that
the phenomena of nature, which compose the weft of our thoughts,
are possible to be thought. And the consciousness of our personal
identity is the condition of any thought. 59
Moving from the syntheses to individual unity, Lachelier again combines the
original synthetic unity of apperception, the empirical unity of consciousness,
and the paralogism of substantiality into one single thought.
The general method of his reflection, as well as the logical progression within
these lectures, produce what one can call a transcendental idealism. They sketch
an outline concerning induction that Lachelier's 1871 dissertation, Du fonde ment de l'induction (On the foundation of induction), will further develop;
regarding determinism, they draw a frame Boutroux will fill, with a few gaps,
in his dissertation, De la contingence des lois de la nature (On the contingency
of the laws of nature).
Neo-Kantianism reached a preeminent position in French philosophy
through Lachelier's teaching for the following reasons: he was a very charismatic professor; he taught at the ENS from 1864 to 1875; his lectures were
copied and studied by at least twenty promotions of students,60 some of whom
in turn became the most influential professors of their time - Boutroux, Liard,
Paul and Jules Tannery, Janet, Seailles, Brunschvicg. 61 And in addition to his
teaching, Lachelier held important official positions such as the presidency of
the Agregation, a nationwide competitive examination one needed to take in
order to teach in higher education, and the general inspector of public education.
In 1876, not even ten years after Ravaisson's Rapport, Desire Nolen (18381904), in his Inaugural Lecture at the University of Montpellier succeeding
58. Claude Bernard (1813-78) was a French physiologist. His Introduction ai'etude de La medecine experirnentale (I 865) was universally considered as a classic di scourse on the scientific
method, comparable only to the works of Newton. A professor at the College de France
from 1847 to 1878, when he died he was given a public funeral, the firs t man of science to be
awarded that honor in France.
59. Ibid. , 51; see also 122.
60. Entering classes in the Ecole Normale are referred to as "promotions:'
61. Cf. Celestin Bougie, "Spiritualisme et Kantisme en France, Jules Lachelier;' La Revue de Paris
(May I, 1934), as well as Leon Brunschvicg, Pniface to CEuvres de J. Lachelier (Paris: Felix Alcan,
1933), xix.
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Boutroux (another important figure of French neo-Kantianism) , remarked that
"over the last ten years, it seems that Kant's Critique has become the constant
and common study of philosophical minds:'62 This, he continued, sets the stage
for a truly European philosophy.63 Boutroux, in his lectures on Kant delivered
from 1894 to 1897 and 1900 to 1901 at the Sorbonne, writes:
moreover, we, the French, have today a closer relationship with Kant's
philosophy than we had fifty years ago ... .These studies contributed to the awakening of the metaphysical sense in our country .. ..
Hence, to go back to Kant is not only to act as a scholar, as a historian, as a dilettante; it is to draw useful knowledge and forces us to
face the problems imposed on us [today].64
Meanwhile Louis Liard (1846-1917),65 a noteworthy neo-Kantian, student of
Lachelier and friend of Boutroux, had become the director of the Enseignement
Superieur, France's university educational system between 1884 and 1902.
Finally, almost half a century after Lachelier started teaching, Brunschvicg, the
last great neo-Kantian of that period, concluded: "From 1870 on, a philosophical University has been built in France that should bear the name of Lachelier,
just like the Old University bears the name of Victor Cousin:'66 The main neoKantian figures of this new "philosophical university" are Emile Boutroux, Emile
Meyerson,67 Leon Brunschvicg, and Octave Hamelin.
After Lachelier, Boutroux is the key figure in the development of French neoKantianism. 68 He is at the center of the intellectual and the institutional network
62. Desire Nolen , Kant et la ph ilosophie du XIX siecle (Montpellier: Martel Aine, 1877), 12.
63. He neglected to mention the important contributions from Italian neo-Kantianism.
64. Emile Boutroux, La Philosophie de Kant: Cours de M. Emile Boutroux (Sorbonn e 1896- 1897)
(Paris: Vrin, 1926), 12.
65. Cf. Charles Lyon-Caen, "Notice sur la vie et les travaux de M. Louis Liard;' Seances et travaux
de l'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques 81 (1921), and Alain Renaut, Les Revolutions
de l'universite (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1995), 156ff.
66. Leon Brunschvicg, Ecrits Philosophiques, 3 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 195158), vol. 2, 206.
67. Emile Meyerson (1859-1933) , a Polish chemist who emigrated to Germany, then to France,
exerted a strong influence on French philosophy, although, like Renouvier, he was never
completely part of the system. His antipositivism, his Kantian and neocritical background
as well as his discussion of contemporary science and his participation in discussions with
Poincare, Brunschvicg, and Langevin make him a noteworthy figure worthy of the renewed
interest he is attracting.
68. Cf. Fabien Capeilleres, "Genealogie d 'un Neokantisme Fran~ais: aPropos d' Emile BoutrouX;'
Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Neokantismes 3 (1997), and "To Reach for Metaphysics:
Emile Boutroux's Philosophy of Science;' in Luft and Makkreel, Neo-Kantianism in

Contemporary Philosophy.
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constitutive of the French higher education system. His work can be understood as an attempt to carryon the spiritualism of his masters, Ravaisson and
Lachelier, in a Kantian guise. The problem around which his thought revolves
is the reconciliation of the universal validity of scientific laws (which seems to
involve an ontological necessity and therefore determinism), human freedom
(the condition for morality), and religion.
This problem is precisely what he calls "Kant's problem": "How is science
possible? How is morality possible? How is the reconciliation of science and
morality possible?"69 And later he states: "Kant's problem is ours. His writings
talk about us: nostra res agitur. "70 Despite several themes that can be considered
Kantian, Boutroux's solution to the problem is not Kantian, and one cannot
but assert that his understanding of the a priori and of the transcendental that
he rejects is rather weak. One of the main interests is his treatment of science,
which is both metaphysical and epistemological, and he is closely related to
major scientists of the period such as his own son, Pierre Boutroux, and his
brother-in-law, Henri Poincare l Boutroux's Kantianism has also been considered an influence on Poincare's contributions to the problem of hypotheses, as
well as on his conventionalism.72 Within this constellation, the Tannery brothers
were also of major importance.
Brunschvicg constitutes the apex of French neo- Kantianism, a status also
claimed by Renouvier's heir, Hamelin?3 Brunschvicg's achievement was a
strictly methodological understanding of what he calls "the idea of critique:'
His achievement is deployed via a "wider and richer" use of "the truth of the
transcendental method:'74 The general movement is similar to the "historization" and the "dynamization" of the transcendental operating in German neoKantianism, in particular, the Marburg School.
What will be left of the theory of transcendental consciousness, once one
recognizes that algebra and geometry, mechanics and physics do not resign
themselves to this docile immobility that Kant expected? And what will one

n

69. Boutroux, La Philosophie de Kant, 9; see also 266.
70. Ibid., 11-12. This is a reference to Horace's "Nam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet"
. (it becomes your concern when your neighbor's wall is on fire).
71. Cf. Mary Jo Nye, "The Boutroux Circle and Poincare's Conventionalism;' Journal of the History
of Ideas 1 (1979).
72. Cf. Les Sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: Felix Aican,
1933),351.
73. This is a perspective held for instance by Dominique Parodi; see La Philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: Felix Aican, 1919). Brunschvicg <:nswers in "L'Orientation du rationalism" (Berits Philosophiques, vol. 2, 25): "we do not find any trace of critical thought in
neo-criticism:'
74. Leon Brunschvicg, 'TIMe critique et Ie systeme Kantien:' Revue de metaphysique et de morale
31(2) (1924),153.
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make of the fact that, during the nineteenth century, they broke the limits that
the "Transcendental Aesthetic:' the "Transcendental Analytic;' and the First
Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature had commanded them to respect
as the finallayout?75
The answer is somewhat brutal: "we should leave to some neo- Kantians and
to Kant himself the postulate of this solidarity between the idea of critique and
the table of the forms or the categories, since we know today that this solidarity
expresses the most superficial and fragile aspect of the doctrine:'76 Brunschvicg
then proceeds to pOint to a cleavage in the transcendental method: "The method
put to work by the transcendental deduction is a reflexive analysis; it starts from
science considered as a fact, and goes back to the a priori forms of intuitions and
pure concepts of the understanding:'77 This first moment, reminiscent of Cohen,
is legitimate in Brunschvicg's eyes, especially since it reverts to the unity of transcendental apperception, an important element for someone who also wants to
claim the spiritualist inheritance. However, when a philosopher considers the
system of categories as fixed once and for all, and limits deduction to that of the
principles of a determined moment of physics (Newton, for instance), then the
progressive synthesis that leads to all the dimensions of spirit will be lacking.
Brunschvicg's understanding of the "idea of critique" will be exercised as
"reflexive analysis" on all fields of human knowledge: science, morality, religion,
art, and history, in order to produce the system of critical idealism that presents
the life of the spirit in all its directions as well as in its unity.
Brunschvicg's enormous influence was at its peak in the 1920s. Setting aside
his impressive intellectual stature, we see that he exerted his influence through
all dimensions of the French system: he held a key teaching position at the
Sorbonne (for thirty years, beginning in 1909), was president of the Agregation
(1936-38), for many years was part of the academic-political network that
oversaw the philosophy curriculum and the awarding of positions and grants,
and was founder of the journal Revue de M8aphysique et de Morale (with Xavier
Leon in 1893) and of the Societe Fran<;:aise de Philosophie (1901, with Leon and
Andre Lalande).
At the end of the nineteenth century, neo-Kantianism was not only the
preeminent philosophy in France, but had also become the philosophie officielle. But soon Boutroux left center stage in favor of his most famous student and
the true heir of spiritualism, Henri Bergson; Bachelard overshadowed Meyerson;
Brunschvicg became the embodiment of the mandarin, confronted by young

75. Ibid., 152 .
76. Ibid., 153.
77. Ibid.
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materialists such as Georges Politzer78 and Marxists such as Paul Nizan 79 or
by philosophers such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. These thinkers found their
inspirations in new figures in German philosophy - the early Husserl, Heidegger
- and subscribed to their criticisms of Kant.
To take a look at the influence of neo- Kantianism on post -Second World War
French intellectual life, one of the most interesting developments of French neoKantianism is the role it played in the rise of structuralism. Martial Gueroult's
(1891-1976) reflections on the Kantian concept of architectonics, his familiarity with the neo- Kantian "quarrel of the system;'80 and his reading of Karl
Mannheim's Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie (The structural analysis
of epistemology, 1922), resulted in his highly interesting structural methodology
concerning the history of philosophy. Considering all genetic, chronological, and
biographical studies merely preliminary steps, he argued that the analysis should
proceed to an internal reconstruction of the philosophical work considered as a
monument constructed by layers and successions of proofs. The more original
rational conditions of the system consist in its transcendental conditions, just as,
in Kant, the structure of the idea of pure reason forms a transcendental condition
of a system. Victor Goldschmidt followed this path in his work in the history of
philosophy.8! But more important is the affiliation with Jules Vuillemin (19202001),82 in which the meaning of the concept of structure shifted. It originally
78. See his 1926 attack in Bcrits, Jacques Debouzy (ed.) (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969) 1,29.
79. Cf. Paul Nizan, Les Chiens de garde (Paris: Rieder, 1932).
SO. The quarrel of the system was a fierce debate regarding two issues: (i) Could philosophy
fulfill its claim to be a science only through the form of a system? And, given a positive
answer to this first question: (ii ) What kind of system' should it be? Regarding the first
claim, Hermann Cohen writes: "The philosophy reaches its concept only as system" (Logik
der rein en Erkenntniss, 3rd ed. [Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1922], 601). Concerning the seco nd
claim, Natorp (like Cassirer) has a preference for the concept of a systematic: "Systematic, not
system" (in Philosophische Systematik [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958], 1). Rickert is also quite
clear: "Unsystematic thought means unphilosophical thought" (in Allgemeine Grundlegung
der Philosophie [Tubingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1921 ], II; see also Grundprobleme der Philosophie
[Tlibingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1934], 1-25). He develops the concept of an "open system." What
is here at stake is to be systematic without being dogmatic (or Hegelian!). See Christian
Krijnen, Philosophie als System: Prinzipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken
bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie (Wurzburg: Kiinigshausen
& Neumann, 2008) .
81. Victor Goldschmidt (1914-81) was well known for his application of a structuralist method
of reading, inaugurated by Gueroult, to ancient philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the
Stoics, and so on) as well as to Rousseau. For some reservations, see Jacques Brunschwig,
"Goldschmidt and Gueroult: Some Facts, Some Enigmas;' Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie
88 (2006).
82. Cf. Joseph Vidal-Rosset, "De Martial Gueroult it Jules Vuillemin, analyse d 'une Filiation;'
in Le Paradigme de la filiation, Jean Gayon and Jean -Jacques Wunenberger (eds) (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 1995).

79

SEBASTIAN LUFT AND FABIEN CAPEILLERES

referred to a scientificity gained through systematicity, but systematicity was now
understood through logic and mathematical axiomatic. Gilles-Gaston Granger
(1920- ) played an important role in this transformation. These intellectual affinities (and friendships) resulted in academic appointments: Gueroult, who held
the Chair of History and Technology of Philosophical Systems at the College de
France (1951-62), nominated Vuillemin for a Chair of Philosophy of Knowledge
(1962-90). And Vuillemin appointed Foucault to succeed him at the University
of Clermont-Ferrand, then at the College de France (where he held a Chair of
History of Systems of Thought, 1970-84); Granger succeeded Foucault in 1986,
renaming the Chair "Comparative EpistemologY:'83
This logico-mathematical transformation of the concept of structure also
impacted the writing of the history of philosophy (as well as history itself),
leading, for instance, on the one hand, to the work of Michel Serres and Daniel
Parrochia and, on the other, to Althusser's praxis in his reading of Capital and
Foucault's "archeologY:'84The end of this story is better known, although often in
a very confused fashion owing to the omission of the first episodes: to the math ematical paradigm a linguistic one would be added (Saussure, Benveniste) that in
turn would lead, by a complete reversal, to neostructuralism or poststructuralism,
while a Heideggerian intellectual background (blended with various proportions
of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud) would come to replace the Kantian paradigm.
Today, neo- Kantianism is still active in France: in epistemology, philosophy
of mathematics, and philosophy of physics one might mention the work of Jean
Petitot,85Michel Bitbol, Jean Seidengart, and Pierre Kerszberg; Alexis Philonenko
in the history of philosophy; Alain Renaut in moral and political philosophy as
well as education; and a neo-Kantian, Luc Ferry, became minister of education.

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, the label "neo-Kantianism" was applied to a variety of tendencies within the philosophical scene in Europe, mainly Germany and France, to a

83. It is also worth noting that Jacques Bouveresse, who presented his 1995 College de France
Chair of Philosophy of Language and of Knowledge as "in a way succeeding" those of
Vuillemin and Granger, devoted his 2007 and 2008 lectures to a question formulated after
a title of Vuillemin's book: "What are philosophical systems?" The lectures not only dealt
expliCitly with Vuillemin, but also with the tradition coming from Renouvier, Gueroult, and
Hyppolite.
*84. Serres and Foucault are discussed in essays by Derek Robbins and Timothy O'Leary in The

History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 6.
*85. The work ofJean Petitot is discussed in "The Structuralist Legacy" by Patrice Maniglier in The
History of Continental Philosophy: Volum e 7.
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lesser extent Italy and the United Kingdom, at a certain period of time, roughly
between 1870 and 1930. 86 While the peak of this movement can be said to have
come to an end after the First World War, the Second World War seemingly sent
it into oblivion. In the late 1970s, neo- Kantianism's importance and dominance
in its own days began to be rediscovered in scholarship. This led to a philosophical revival, which is now palpable in nearly all fields of philosophical work.
For instance, the question of a priori knowledge is discussed in contemporary
philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of science. It is also remarkable that this European trend of "continental" philosophy is currently gaining
leverage in the US, with the works and the influence ofJohn Rawls in ethics and
political philosophy and, for example, Michael Friedman in both philosophy
of science and the genesis of analytical philosophy. Today, neo-Kantianism is
slowly regaining its status as a major interlocutor with phenomenology and
analytical philosophy, a status first exemplified, for instance, by the relations
between Husserl and Natorp and its influence on Carnap.
In one sense, then, the term "neo-Kantianism" refers mainly to this period of
time. In another sense, the term "neo-Kantian" can be understood in the manner
in which philosophers today call themselves "neo-Fregean" or "neo-Pragmatist;'
by which they mean an alliance to these philosophers, not in the letter or in
correct exegesis of the great thinker's true intentions, but in the spirit of the
philosophers in question. It is in this sense that the neo- Kantians discussed here
perceived themselves as furthering Kant's true intentions, be it in dismissing
some elements in Kant's system for the sake of others or emphasizing those that
they perceived to reveal a true kernel in the midst of other problematic intuitions in Kant's thought. In this effort, they not only ~rought forth highly original
avenues of Kant interpretation that are still essentially pursued today, but also
produced a range of interesting new systematic approaches and theories that are
far from obsolete and deserve to be studied anew. 87
If one were to summarize in the briefest terms its philosophical importance,
one could call neo-Kantianism a philosophy of culture, whereby culture is itself
the problematic philosophical term, the terminus ad quem. Philosophy, then,

86. Regarding Italian neo-Kantianism, see Massimo Ferrari, lntroduzione a iI neocriticismo (Rome:
Laterza, 1997) and, more specifically, I dati dellesperienza: II Neokantismo di Felice Tocco nella
filosofia Italiana tra ottocento e novecento (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1990). UK neo-Kantianism
is more difficult to characterize since it forms components of another complex philosophical
movement: British idealism. Philosophers such as T. H. Green (1836- 82), Edward Caird
(1835-1908), and R. G. Collingwood (1889- 1943) are often identified as neo-Kantians.
87. Two recent anthologies will help make neo-Kantianism more accessible for scholarship in
the English language: Luft and Makkreel, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, and
Dominic Moran and Sebastian Luft (eds), The Neo -Kantianism Reader (London: Routledge,
2010) .
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is placed in the service of human culture in modern society, which values and
upholds the fundamental beliefs of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment:
reason, equality, freedom. Neo-Kantianism stands, to borrow a phrase from
Ursula Renz, for a culture of rationality and the rationality of culture. Whether
such an ideal and the consequences following from it will be allowed to survive
in the so-called age of postmodernity is another question. Be that as it may, both
as a starting-point for understanding the philosophical tendencies that would
emerge and define the twentieth century, and as a vast quarry of inspiring ideas
and timeless systematic approaches, one will need to reassess the neo- Kantian
movement. 88
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